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Abstract 
  
The creation of a centralized national identity becomes a challenge when a nation faces 
strong, alternative identities that conflict or do not clearly align with the socio-cultural norms of 
the national one. In the case of Spain, these alternative identities include both regional identities 
and external national identities. This project directly looks at the Catalan independence 
referendum of 2017, the shifting immigration demographics and patterns in Spain, and Spanish 
citizens’ willingness to accept alternative identities into the national framework in order to better 
understand the current challenges to the consolidation of a Spanish national identity. This paper 
will argue that Spain does not have the ability to establish a cohesive national identity because 
its long history of internal division and exclusion of both internal and external “others” has 
created a separation between individuals with alternative identities and the Spanish state. 
Rather than embracing these distinct identities and establishing Spain as a multicultural state, it 
chooses to prioritize assimilation and create a culture of exclusion that is unwelcoming to 
alternative identities. 
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I. Introduction 
 
“It is only when you meet someone of a different culture from yourself that you begin to realize 
what your own beliefs really are.” - George Orwell 
 All nations in today’s globalized world face the profound challenge of integrating a 
multitude of new ideas, beliefs, people, goods, and histories into their own cultural and social 
framework. Today, a nation’s ability to adapt to a world constantly in dynamic change is central 
to its survival and advancement in the international arena. As such, the topic of migration and its 
role in carrying culture around the globe is at the forefront of international conversations. Host 
nations must choose how they will integrate these new people and perspectives into the fabric 
of their society. Furthermore, many nations also face the distinct challenge of reconciling 
multiple regional or ethnic identities within their own nation to establish cohesion of identity at 
the national level. Through the greater exchange and visibility of alternative or dissenting ideas 
and beliefs in the modern day, a state is forced to reassess what makes up its own national 
identity and either choose to adapt to and embrace the changing culture of identity or resist it.  
This project will study the 2017 Catalan referendum, as a reflection of a contemporary 
Spanish national identity conflict, and recent immigration trends in Spain to address the 
question: How do shifts in immigration patterns and expressions of regionalism affect the way 
Spanish citizens view and understand their central national identity? More specifically, can one 
identify rises in immigration, or the perceived rise in immigration, and the entrenched history of 
regional diversity as root causes of national identity conflicts in Spain? This research will show 
that national identity conflicts occur, in part, in response to shifts in the ethno-cultural 
demographics of a given state and in the challenging of its socio-cultural norms. Both the 
Catalan separatist movement and shifting demographic patterns in immigration to Spain can be 
seen then as challenges, or even threats, to the central Spanish identity, because they 
exemplify what it means to exist in the Spanish state while adhering to different beliefs and 
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values from those which the state claims are inherent. Both regionalism and immigration, 
therefore, challenge the socio-cultural standard of the nation and provoke strong reactions from 
those who believe in an assimilationist approach to building and maintaining national identity. 
Basing this study in the belief that national identity is defined by socio-cultural assimilation and 
uniformity, recent shifting opinions among Spanish nationals regarding the importance of 
immigrant assimilation as well as recent surges in regionalism have prioritized self-definition and 
regional autonomy over a single, unifying national identity. 
 
II. Literature Review 
 
A. National Identity 
 
National identity can be a difficult term to define because it varies among disciplines and 
among individual scholars. In a single journal alone, one can find multiple scholars’ definitions of 
national identity. In “The Construction of National Identity in Modern Times: Theoretical 
Perspective”, Gilroy grounds national identity in the concepts of the status quo, assimilation, and 
uniformity, viewing it as “a melting pot which has the assimilating character by depending on the 
notions of citizenship and patriotism” (İnaç and Ünal, 2013, p.229). On the other hand, Kymlicka 
views national identity formation as rooted in culture and social influences and believes it has an 
“inclusive character by respecting cultural differences” (İnaç and Ünal, 2013, p.229). Others, 
including Anderson, Güvenç, and Yurdusev, have a constructivist perspective and see it as a 
result of nation building processes, politicization, and/or socialization. These definitions, among 
others, establish national identity as created through individual and societal interpretations of 
what a given group identifies as the qualities of its national identity. For the purposes of this 
study, national identity will be interpreted as the social and cultural factors that interact to define 
a people’s understanding of themselves as part of a given nation. Here it is also important to 
recognize that the term “nation” refers to a group of people with a shared identification, whereas 
a “state” refers to a sovereign governed territory. Therefore, national identity is challenging to 
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understand because it can exist at various levels outside of the state’s interpretation of identity. 
This will become clearer in a later discussion of Spanish regionalism. 
 
B. Social Identity Theory 
 
In general, all the research regarding the connection between identity and immigration, 
scholars cite political psychologist Henri Tajvel’s Social Identity Theory, primarily referencing the 
core concept of the “us/them” mentality. “Social identity theory assumes that individuals tend to 
identify more strongly with their in-group compared to the out-group, and that strong in-group 
identification is associated with positive in-group stereotyping”; in the context of migration, 
immigrants are assumed to exist in an uncertain balance of in-group and outgroup, given neither 
their home nor their destination country fits either mold entirely (Tartakovsky, 2009, p.656). 
Similarly, regional groups can fit into either category as within a dominant nation regionalists 
might be categorized as the outliers while within their own regional groups they will be 
considered insiders.  
Alternatively, Social Identity Theory also is reflected in the attitudes of nationals of the 
receiving nation. According to Tajvel’s theory, “groups perceived as threatening [to] a nation’s 
distinctive identity are likely to elicit hostility. Opposition to immigration stems just as much from 
who the migrants are, especially their ethnic and cultural characteristics: if they are perceived as 
a threat to national identity” (Cea D’Ancona, 2016, p.570). Likewise, regional identities pose a 
threat to national identity, eliciting opposition and even hostility from those who desire to 
maintain a central national identity. Based on public reactions towards immigrants and 
regionalists, we can come to the understanding that a national identity conflict occurs when a 
nation experiences threats to what it claims to be its distinctive identity. Though this identity is 
rarely clearly defined and agreed upon on a national scale, national identity conflicts are often 
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reflected as disruptions or variations in the traditional ethno-cultural, and sometimes religious, 
status quo. 
 
C. Globalization and Identity 
 
The challenge of determining a nation’s cohesive ethno-cultural identity is complicated 
by the extensive global histories of colonialism and is presently complicated by the forces of 
globalization. More often than not, a nation defines its cultural identity through the histories of 
the colonizers, ignoring the variety of cultural influences that often built many of these nations.1 
Spain has an extensive imperial history of domination and appropriation of other nations and 
ethnic groups, but has formed its central national identity separate from the groups from which 
they took land and culture.2 Spain finds the roots of much of its identity in Arabic and African 
culture, and yet the “Spanish identity” continually is exclusionary towards migrants coming from 
these lands. For example, despite the central role of Islamic culture in the development of 
modern Spain, many Spanish cities implemented burqa bans in the late 2000s, contributing to a 
larger conversation surrounding multiculturalism that categorized a large Muslim population “as 
those traditionally perceived as ‘less integratable’ into Western societies” (Cea D’Ancona, 2016, 
p.579). In other words, Spain has attempted to distinguish its identity from its imperialist past to 
the extent that those groups who contributed most distinctly to the creation of this culture are 
now excluded from it. As Spain continues to ground its socio-cultural identity in its colonial past, 
                                               
1 The United States, for example, “claims to be ‘a nation of immigrants’ open to ‘the huddled masses’” but 
generally views itself as a result of European descent and influence (Johnson et. all, 2005, n.p.). As such, 
to those who view social cohesion as maintaining the status quo, the American ethno-cultural identity was 
lost in the civil rights era when Eurocentric power structures were challenged and those traditionally on 
the margins of US culture were allowed into the mainstream (Johnson et. all, 2005).  
2 Building out of this understanding of identity as rooted in imperialism, it is crucial to ground research in 
the concepts of “post-colonialism” and neo-imperialism to investigate whether or not national identity can 
be seen as an extension of imperialism. According to Linda Tuhiwai-Smith, from an indigenous 
perspective, “globalization is substituted for the word imperialism” (Smith, 2013, p.25) so when we look at 
identity formation and its impacts on immigration as global processes, we must also critically look at how 
they reinforce the imperial world system in which “the institutions and legacy of colonialism have 
remained” (Smith, 2013, p.101). 
 Spain: Migration, Regionalism, and National Identity 7 
it will inevitably continue to exclude immigrants and regionalists of diverse backgrounds from the 
dominant Spanish society. 
 
D. Integration vs. Multiculturalism 
 
This idea that integration lies in an immigrant’s ability to “blend in” to the dominant socio-
cultural framework (i.e. the national identity) of a society emphasizes the important role national 
identity has in creating a culture of either acceptance or rejection of others. In a study gauging 
discrimination against immigrants in Spain, “the accelerated growth of immigration” as well as 
“the role of cultural factors from the country of origin” are cited as the primary root causes of 
discrimination against immigrants (Agudelo-Suarez, 2009, p.1869). Most notably, this includes 
discrimination against certain groups based on religion, culture, and language, implying that 
those with cultures most similar to the traditional Spanish culture will have an easier time 
integrating and those most dissimilar will be excluded. The immigrants studied in this case 
claimed that “there are clear differences between social groups, and certain nationalities are 
more discriminated against than others” and that the discrimination they individually and 
collectively experience is attributed to the “intercultural relationship between natives and 
immigrants” (Agudelo-Suarez, 2009, p.1870). Ultimately, this ability to distance oneself from the 
distinct features of one’s home country and adopt one’s host society becomes one of the most 
important factors to acceptance in a society, such as Spain, that values assimilation and 
subscription to cultural norms as the standard for social cohesion. 
These concepts of identity and immigration are unified by this conversation surrounding 
integration policies. In other words, the ways a nation chooses to integrate “outsiders” into its 
societal structure  are “understood as platforms that reflect (along with being constituted and 
conditioned by) host-communities’ definitions and re-definitions of collective self-identity, as well 
as (re)identification with the ‘other’” (Alkopher, 2015, p.430). Political psychologist Tal Alkopher 
posits this conversation in a security context and claims that immigration is often seen as one of 
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the most prominent threats to societal security because it is “something that can change the 
receiving society’s identity by shifting the composition of the population” (Alkopher, 2015, 
p.431). When contextualized this way, it becomes clear that the way a nation defines its own 
identity is indelibly tied to immigration politics, as immigration becomes the “problem” or “threat” 
that challenges societal norms and the fundamental understandings of identity. As was 
previously discussed, some see this threat as vitally important to address, as they see national 
identity and what Alkopher refers to as “societal security” as static and homogenous. These 
individuals view the “other” as abjectly different and in order for them to no longer be a threat, 
they must first assimilate to “the dominant traditional national values and perceived common 
identity” of their new nation (Alkopher, 2015, p.433). Through this model and perspective, a 
society can achieve collective security through complete assimilation and integration or, 
alternatively, exclude outsiders altogether if they are perceived to be unintegratable. This model 
creates the idea that  uncertainty surrounding identity can be eliminated if everyone in a society 
subscribes to the same norms and beliefs, customs, and traditions (Alkopher, 2015). 
An alternate perspective on societal securitization comes through a belief in 
multiculturalism. Multiculturalists view national identity as something that is dynamic. They 
believe that ethnic identities are important factors in shaping the socio-political makeup of a 
nation, but not that political identities should be definitively determined by “the receiving 
society’s collective identity of its cultural and ethnic content” (Alkopher, 2015, p.434). Rather, 
they value and respect a diversity of identities and believe that they can exist in harmony with 
the dominant identity. This perspective views immigration practically and pragmatically and 
believes fundamentally that “a flexible conception of the collective self-identity enables the 
framing of diversity and immigrants not as an existential threat but rather as something that can 
be enriching, in terms of culture, economics, or other” (Alkopher, 2015, p.437). Multiculturalists 
would simultaneously hold a positive opinion towards regional diversity within a nation and 
would propose that a central national identity does not necessarily need to co opt distinct 
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regional identities, but rather that they could exist in harmony with the national one. Overall, 
multiculturalists fundamentally do not view the “other” as a threat but rather view alternative 
beliefs and identities as enriching and beneficial to maintaining a healthy and cohesive society. 
Moreover, as the world continues to globalize through cross-cultural interactions and transglobal 
migration, this viewpoint becomes essential given these enriching interactions between people 
and cultures will not stop in the foreseeable future. 
 
E. Identity Politics 
 
Finally, the recent rise in identity politics poses a challenge to national identity formation 
both in the context of immigration and regionalism. Though there are many definitions of identity 
politics in literature, its modern iteration can most clearly be seen as “a form of critical pedagogy 
that links social structure with the insights of poststructuralism regarding the nature of 
subjectivity, while incorporating a Marxist commitment to politics” (Bernstein, 2005, p.47). The 
identity politics of today include the use of identity as a determinant of social structure and 
definitively links this social structure with political practice. As such, political action can no longer 
be viewed without the lens of identity. Therefore, finding a collective and cohesive national 
identity, something that could already be seen as a challenge prior to this trend, becomes all the 
more difficult as people continue to tie their own individual identities with political belief. As a 
result, national identity becomes somewhat undefinable and “nothing so disorients an individual 
or a people as an identity undefined, threatened, in flux” (Ventura, 2008, n.p.). Here emerges a 
space ripe for a national identity crisis, or what Ventura refers to as “a panic of identity”. The 
individualization of politics and the rising trans-global interactions of the modern globalized 
world will inevitably challenge the residual ethno-cultural definitions of identity left over from the 
imperial world and force the adaptation to a new, irreversible social order that is defined by 
individual and regional identity. 
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III. Research and Findings 
 
A. Research Design & Methodology 
This is a project built primarily on secondary research of both quantitative and qualitative 
data regarding immigration, regionalism, and national identity in Spain. With an initial 
understanding of national identity formation processes and the ways they are affected by the 
processes of immigration and regional division, one can more closely analyze the development 
of a national identity conflict in the context of otherization and exclusion. Ultimately, however, 
this project must be understood as a case study and therefore its methods may be replicable in 
order to study and compare other nations, but its conclusions may not be generalizable to apply 
to all nations experiencing similar phenomena. The global case study method is particularly 
useful to this project as immigration, regionalism, and national identity are issues that have 
permeated the political and social agendas of many nations around the world. Though this 
paper will be analyzing the effects of immigration and regionalism on national identity 
specifically in the case of Spain, a similar study could be conducted on multiple other nations to 
better understand how a seemingly local, or in this case state, level phenomenon has 
implications for the rest of the world. One of the central foci of the global case study method is 
its ability to connect abstract global trends to their local, real life effects and vice versa (Darian-
Smith and McCarty, 2017). As such, this paper will look closely at the local impacts of the global 
trends of migration and regional division on folks living in Spain, including but not limited to 
natural born citizens, naturalized and non-naturalized migrants, and those who claim a regional 
identity in place of the Spanish identity, and will specifically look at the way global trends impact 
the way localized individuals view and understand their own national identity.  
 
B. Creating a “Spanish Identity”: Historical Context of Regionalism and Conflicting Identities 
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Developing an awareness of Spanish history, its unique relationship with regionalism, 
and the formation of a “Spanish identity” is essential to understanding its many national identity 
challenges in recent decades. With the final collapse of the Spanish empire at the end of the 
19th century, many Spanish citizens found themselves in a crisis of identity as their nation’s 
historic global power was called into question. Many intellectuals at the time began to scrutinize 
the decadence and despotism that led to the ultimate fall of the Spanish empire and investigate 
what it really meant to be “Spanish”. This historic period of transition called for a redefinition of 
the Spanish identity: one promoted by the state and centered in Castilian3 culture (Kleiner-
Liebau, 2009). 
Throughout the 20th century, Spanish national identity came to be refined and 
consolidated by the dictatorships of Primo de Rivera and Francisco Franco. Franco, specifically, 
centralized national identity along with political power and created a “true Spain” that was 
indisputably Catholic, traditional, and Castilian (Kleiner-Liebau, 2009, p.49). Throughout his 
regime, Franco emphasized centralization at the expense of regional diversity, with one school 
book at the time even claiming “that all Spain’s ills have stemmed from lack of unity” (Kleiner-
Liebau, 2009, p.50). All other identities, particularly the “historic Nationalities” (i.e. The Basque 
Country, Catalonia, and Galicia) which had already developed their own regional identities and 
institutions, were rejected and often brutally repressed by the central government (Kleiner-
Liebau, 2009, p.51). Many of the more modern regional movements, including the Catalan 
separatist movement of 2017, find their roots in this period of Spanish identity formation and 
centralization that ultimately resulted in their own repression and exclusion. 
                                               
3 Castilians are descendents of the Kingdom of Castile that originally combined with that of Aragon to 
create the Spanish state. The Castilian language (modern day standard Spanish) came to dominate 
Spain following the consolidation of kingdoms due to their far reaching presence throughout the Iberian 
Peninsula. Castilian culture, specifically the norms of Roman-Catholicism and the Castilian language, 
were so pervasive and influential that they have come to define Spanish culture today. 
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Regionalism4 today, though certainly more accepted than during Franco’s regime, is still 
treated with great caution in Spanish society. And yet, regionalism in Spain is unavoidable as it 
is rooted deeply in Spanish history and part of the core identity of many Spanish citizens. 
Though political power had been centralized in Madrid since the seventeenth century, the first 
areas to experience economic and social modernization in the early nineteenth century were 
those on the periphery of the nation, the Basque Country and Catalonia, both areas with distinct 
cultural and linguistic identities from the rest of Spain (Balfour, 2011). These diverse regions 
called for greater autonomy from the Spanish state and have since experienced various 
grantings and withholdings of autonomy from the Spanish central government, which has 
caused great tension and uncertainty in the relationship between these powers. The current 
relationship between the central government and autonomous regions is grounded in the 
Constitution of 7 December 1978, which declared the “indissoluble unity of the Spanish Nation, 
common and indivisible patria of all Spaniards,” but also “recognizes and guarantees the right to 
autonomy of the nationalities and regions that compose it and the solidarity among them all”5 
(Constitución de 7 diciembre 1978, artículo 2). 
These various fluxes in regional autonomous control have contributed to the 
strengthening of regional identities, causing many to question whether or not Spain should be 
considered a nation in and of itself, or, rather, a set of many distinct sub-nations combined 
under a single name (Boyd, 1997). To make matters even more complicated, the dueling forces 
of identification with a specific region and a simultaneous relationship with the overarching 
Spanish nation causes many different understandings of identity among the individuals living in 
these regions. A 1981 survey conducted by the Centro de Investigaciones Sociológicas in 
                                               
4 Regionalism here refers to the fact that Spain is made up of multiple regions that each maintain their 
own individual national identities. The Spanish government is relatively decentralized because many of 
these regions are semi-autonomous and semi-independent. 
5 Original Spanish translation: “La Constitución se fundamenta en la indisoluble unidad de la Nación 
española, patria común e indivisible de todos los españoles, y reconoce y garantiza el derecho a la 
autonomía de las nacionalidades y regiones que la integran y la solidaridad entre todas ellas” 
(Constitucion de 7 diciembre 1978, artículo 2). 
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Madrid revealed, rather unsurprisingly, that each identity subgroup studied tended to 
characterize themselves more positively than others, thus strengthening Tajvel’s theory that 
positive stereotyping occurs in relation to the “in-group” rather than the “out-group” (Boyd, 
1997). However, the more surprising results of this study showed how few, and in many cases 
no, overlaps existed between the self-identified characteristics of regional identities and the 
national Spanish identity (Boyd, 1997). Moreover, many of the qualities applied to the Spanish 
identity were negative, with the only positive trait shared between all groups being amantes de 
su tierra, or lovers of their homeland (Boyd, 1997). Affinity for a homeland then becomes a 
reflection of the ties Spaniards feel to their local identities, while their application of negative 
stereotypes to the Spanish identity suggesting that they “define themselves in opposition to the 
identity promoted by the regime: the caballero cristiano6” (Boyd, 1997, p.305).  
Although this study was conducted nearly forty years ago, scholars suspect a survey 
today would produce similar results. In fact, regular studies have been conducted specifically 
regarding Catalan identity in reference to Spanish identity. These studies have shown that the 
Catalan and the Spanish identity are almost always considered distinct from one another, but 
that they are not mutually exclusive. Many citizens, approximately 72% according to a 2003 
study, dual identify with Catalonia and Spain, although to varying degrees. Of this 72%, “only 
40% identified equally strong with Catalan and Spanish identity, whereas 24% felt more Catalan 
than Spanish and 8% more Spanish than Catalan” (Kleiner-Liebau, 2009, p.78). The remaining 
30% of citizens view themselves either as exclusively Catalan or exclusively Spanish, with the 
ratio tilted slightly in favor of the former (Figure 1, Kleiner-Liebau, 2009, p.78). This nuance 
between the regional and national identity creates an interesting dynamic in which multiple 
identities can be seen either in cooperation or in conflict, and it is when identities find 
themselves in conflict that a national identity crisis begins to take hold. 
 
                                               
6 “Christian gentleman” 
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Figure 1: Identification with Spanish and/or Catalan Identities among Catalan citizens 
(data sourced from Kleiner-Liebau, 2009, p.78)  
If national identity formation is to be understood through Social Identity Theory, or 
through an “us vs. them” dynamic, then this distinction between regional identity and national 
identity can be viewed as its own manifestation of in-group vs. out-group identity formation. By 
positing themselves in relation to two distinct identities, the regional and the national, Spanish 
citizens can find themselves in ideological conflict. Those who maintain attachment to both 
identities find themselves stuck in the middle, while those who hold a stronger attachment to 
one identity or the other often find themselves reverting to the “us vs. them” mentality which 
creates the dueling nature between distinct identities. Carolyn Boyd claims that “the oppositional 
character inherent to the formation of national identity (the us-versus-them phenomenon) raises 
serious questions about the viability of “Spain” as an “imagined community”’ (Boyd, 1997, 
p.305). It becomes rather ironic, then, that regionalism is perhaps the most distinct feature of the 
Spanish national identity. If regional difference is inherent to Spanish society, or one could even 
go so far as to say the foundation of Spanish society, then potentially the only way to create 
cohesion and unity in the Spanish state is to respect and acknowledge difference through a 
multicultural approach to identity formation. 
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C. The Internal Other: Regional Division in the Case of Catalonia 
 Through this historical background, it is clear how the Catalan separatist movement 
developed, in part, out of many years of feeling repressed and undervalued by the Spanish 
state. To many in Catalonia, this movement is centrally rooted in a fundamental feeling of 
difference from the values and traits of the Spanish state, claiming that they are “part of a 
distinct, proud nation with its own language, history, culture and flag” (Debating Europe, 2019, 
n.p.). Additionally, they claim that this identity is not respected by the Spanish national 
government and that they fear that the government will seek to absorb this identity into the 
national one (Debating Europe, 2019). To the Catalan people, maintaining an individual identity 
and autonomous power is central to who they are, and this is traditionally something the central 
government has either resisted or completely repressed. Franco’s regime resulted in the severe 
repression of regional autonomy and identification, inflicting what is described as a “cultural 
genocide on Catalonia, dismantling institutions and associations tied to Catalan identity and 
driving the Catalan language into the private sphere” (Balfour, 2017, n.p.). In response to this 
period of authoritarianism, Spain’s process of democratization following Franco’s death in 1975 
prioritized supporting regional autonomy. In fact, in 1979 the autonomy of Catalonia was 
officially recognized by the Spanish state, Catalan is recognized as a “nationality”, and Catalan 
becomes the official language of Catalonia, along with Spanish (Figure 2, Debating Europe)7. 
Briefly, and due to this successful process of democratization, identification with the 
Spanish identity within peripheral regions became somewhat more common as the nation grew 
                                               
7 The Franco regime’s elimination of the Catalan language was arguably one of the most impactful 
incidents of repression throughout Spain’s period of authoritarian rule. According to Boix-Fuster and Sanz 
in Bilingualism and Identity: Spanish at the crossroads with other languages, “language use allows people 
to identify others; and in cases of language contact between majority and minority groups, language 
choice defines their own identity” (Boix-Fuster and Sanz, 2008, p.87). In historical context, Catalonia is 
considered a minoritized society due to the subordination of its language and culture by Spain. Where 
more than one language exist, such as in Catalonia, the choice of which language to use is powerful and 
indicative of social/national identification. Therefore, the repression of one of these language by an 
outside force, such as during the Franco regime, becomes a statement of power and oppression and can 
cause further division in terms of regional identification with the greater state. 
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in international wealth and power and as a relatively decentralized but stable parliamentary 
democracy was established (Alvarez Junto, 2002). However, as the government in Madrid has 
become more conservative in recent years8, it has begun to roll back some of the 
advancements made in regional autonomy since 19759 (Debating Europe, 2019). Especially 
following the violence that took place between voters and national police forces on the day of 
the Catalan referendum, many Catalonians have claimed that the government is reverting back 
to the fascist, repressive tendencies of Franco’s dictatorship (Balfour, 2017). This was further 
solidified when the central government stripped Catalonia’s autonomous government of its 
power following the referendum and decided to pursue legal action against the region’s 
president, Carles Puigdemont10. As a result, many Catalans “do not want to live in a centralised 
Spanish state under a monarchy for whom they have little affection” (Debating Europe, 2019, 
n.p.). Part of the Catalan identity is grounded in its autonomous status, so stripping these 
powers poses a great threat to Catalonia’s fundamental regional identity. Therefore, if Spain 
desires to create a national identity rooted in the values of the central government, it faces 
deep-seated resentment among many Catalans born out of an extensive history of repression 
and fears of a current uptick in oppressive behavior.  
                                               
8 The prime minister of Spain at the time of the Catalan Referendum, Mariano Rajoy, opposed and later 
declared unconstitutional Catalonia’s 1979 statute demanding greater autonomy and fiscal responsibility 
than was originally granted in the 1978 constitution (Balfour, 2017). Therefore, his role as the head of the 
Spanish government does not inspire faith among Catalonian citizens that the government will support 
their rights and independence.  
9 The Spanish government changed the status of Catalan autonomy in 2010 after four years of debate on 
the new Statute of Autonomy. Since these discussions began, there have been more public 
independence rallies and movements throughout the region (Castro, 2016). 
10 Prime Minister Rajoy invoked Article 155, which allows the central government to strip regional 
governments of their autonomy. He claimed he was not revoking the regions autonomy, but 
simultaneously removed from power Catalonia’s governing bodies and transferred their power to the 
central government. This was seen as a betrayal of their constitutional autonomous rights by many 
Catalonians but was supported as a strengthening of rule of law by much of the rest of Spain (Abend, 
2017) 
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Figure 2: Debating Europe - Arguments for and against Catalonia Independence 
 
This movement is not exclusively grounded in identity, but is also spurred in great part 
by economic factors. At the time of the initial transition from empire to democracy at the end of 
the 19th century, both Catalonia and the Basque Country had already begun the process of 
economic modernization while the rest of Spain lagged behind. Their economic development 
caused increased support for independence among Catalonians but also increased skepticism 
from the Spanish state, who feared that their separation would prove economically disastrous 
for the state. This exact dynamic continues to today and is a driving force in the current 
separatist movement. Catalonia is one of the wealthiest regions in Spain and produces 25.6% of 
Spanish exports and 19% of Spain’s GDP despite only 16% of the national population living in 
the region (Catalonia crisis in 300 words, 2018). Additionally, Catalonians believe that there is 
an imbalanced relationship in economics and that Catalonia’s wealth is being taken by the 
Spanish state in excessive taxes, resulting in Catalonia not being able to adequately provide for 
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its citizens (Debating Europe, 2019). Independence, therefore, would allow Catalonia to take 
control of its finances, emerge from debt, and sever the dependent relationship between the 
fiscal power of Catalonia and its obligations to support the rest of the Spanish state. Although 
this economic reasoning plays a large part in the Catalan separatist movement, it does not 
weaken the argument that uncertain national identity is one of its central forces. These 
economic arguments are as deeply rooted in the Spanish history of regional division as those of 
regional identity. The various degrees of economic development and dependency between the 
different regions in Spain and the central government itself has fueled greater mistrust and 
power imbalances within the nation and has driven many to ascribe more directly to a regional 
identity rather than place trust in the Spanish state.  
 
Image 1: Referendum day in Madrid (2017). Image by author.11 
     
D. The External Other: Immigration to Spain in the 21st Century 
Shifting immigration patterns throughout the 21st century have also brought immigration 
to the forefront of many conversations in all member states of the European Union. Spain has 
historically been seen as one of the most welcoming nations to migrants since the 1970s and 
                                               
11 Nationalist responses to the Catalan referendum have been pronounced in many parts of Spain. 
Madrid, in particular, had many pro-Spain and anti-independence rallies in the weeks surrounding the 
referendum. Surges in national pride during times of national identity conflicts will be further analyzed as 
this project develops in the coming months. 
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remains exceptional among other EU states in public attitudes and perceptions towards 
migrants. While other EU nations, including Germany and France, have notoriously witnessed 
surges in anti-immigrant movements in response to new waves of non-EU migration, Spain has 
traditionally avoided such political backlash (Arango, 2013). However, this phenomenon has 
begun to shift within the last ten years as anti-immigrant groups and parties become more vocal 
and powerful throughout the nation, with their most recent advancements coming through the 
far-right, staunchly anti-immigrant party Vox gaining 24 seats in parliament in the 2019 Spanish 
general election (Clarke and Gutiérrez, 2019). While some view this exclusionary trend in light 
of economic insecurity as a legacy of the 2008 global financial crisis, others view these 
changing sentiments towards non-EU migrants in light of a general rising tide of nationalism and 
right-wing politics throughout Europe. Regardless, Spain’s unique history and its currently 
shifting relationship with immigration makes it a unique case study of the impact of migration 
and integration policies and their overarching affect on national identity formation and conflicts.  
Prior to the mid-1970s, Spain was a nation of emigrants rather than immigrants12 
(Kleiner-Liebau, 2009). As this trend reversed in the 70s, Spain began receiving a large number 
of immigrants from elsewhere in the EU. However, at the same time many European nations 
began to enact stricter immigration laws and tighten their borders, thus enabling southern 
European nations like Spain and Italy to become the puerta trasera13 to the rest of Europe 
(Calavita, 2006). Spain, on the other hand, did not implement its first immigration law until 1985 
with the Ley de Extranjería, a law which began a general trend in immigration policy of 
regulating immigration from the ‘Third World’ (Calavita, 2006)14. This law served as a response 
                                               
12 An emigrant refers to an individual who is migrating out of their home country while immigrant refers to 
a person who has left their home country and is entering into a host country. Throughout the process of 
migration, a migrant is both an emigrant and an immigrant as these terms operate along a spectrum of 
migration. 
13 “Back door” 
14  This law is a fascinating reflection of both inclusion and exclusion, as its enactment facilitated the 
inclusion of Spain into the EU while also promoting the exclusion of immigrants from Europe itself. As was 
previously discussed, Spain’s identity formation in the context of Europe has been its own challenging 
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to the strengthening of the EU itself as it sought to create stronger external borders as internal 
borders weakened (Calavita, 2006). More importantly, the 1985 law set a standard within Spain 
of defining immigrants as “others”. By establishing what constituted a ‘legal’ migrant, it also 
subsequently created an ‘illegal’ migrant, a concept which would allow for the systematic 
otherization of migrants throughout contemporary Spanish history. 
This process of institutionalizing otherness has become all the more relevant throughout 
the 21st century. Beginning in 2000, migration patterns in Spain once again began to shift. As 
one of the most distinct gateways to Europe from the African continent, Spain receives 
thousands of migrants moving northward each year, along with large numbers of Romanian 
migrants coming from the east and Ecuadorian migrants coming from South America (Agudelo-
Suarez, 2009). This multitude of ethnic and cultural identities has challenged the central 
Spanish identity and provoked differing reactions regarding immigration policy and integration 
methods among Spanish citizens and the central government, particularly based on the nations 
of origin of the migrants. Though many Spanish nationals have adjusted to and accepted the 
presence of immigrants in daily life (Eurobarometer, 2018), discrimination against migrants, 
particularly those from non-Spanish speaking countries, still persists and there still exists 
disagreement on the proper way to integrate migrants into Spanish society (Agudelo-Suarez, 
2009). Though Spain is considered one of the most welcoming nations in Europe to migrants, 
immigration remains consistently as one of the top two most important “issues” in Spanish 
society and attitudes towards migrants are shifting often with the changing economic and social 
conditions of the state (Cea D’ancona, 2016). 
The population of foreign-born nationals living in Spain more than quadrupled in size, 
from 1.5 million to over 6.5 million, over a period of nine years beginning in 2000 (Cea 
D’ancona, 2016). Although this rate of increase in migration has slowed down and dropped 
                                                                                                                                                       
process and the fact that Spain was tasked with maintaining this European identity through the exclusion 
of others prompts an interesting discussion of national identity, and even supranational identity. 
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overall since 2010, foreign-born nationals still make up nearly 10% of the Spanish population 
(4.66 million) and the number of migrants living in Spain has once again begun to rise since 
2017 (Instituto Nacional de Estadística de España). In the first quarter of 2018, foreign-born 
migrants that entered Spain totalled 248,716 individuals and the overall number of foreign born 
individuals living in Spain was rising at a rate of 2.1% (Figure 3, Instituto Nacional de Estadística 
de España). Since 2000, Spain has received more non-EU immigration than immigration from 
other EU states (Kleiner-Liebau, 2009). Immigrants tend to settle in 4 of the 17 autonomous 
communities in Spain, including Catalonia and Madrid where most non-EU migrants reside due 
to needs in the labor force (Kleiner-Liebau, 2009). In the first quarter of 2018, 56,720 immigrants 
were living in Catalonia alone (Figure 4: Instituto Estadística Nacional de España). It is also 
worth noting that in reality these numbers are likely higher than reported due to the fact that 
many choose not to claim their immigration status due to the uncertainty of legal repurcussions 
(Kleiner-Liebau, 2009).  
 
Figure 3 : Instituto Nacional de Estadística de España 
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Figure 4: Instituto Nacional de Estadística de España  
 
E. Immigration and Identity: The Security of National Identity 
Kleiner-Liebau argues that “in the case of nationalist movements this “Other” can be 
both, an internal “Other”, such as competing national identities or minority nationalisms, or an 
external “Other”, such as other nations or supranational institutions” (Kleiner-Liebau, 2009, 
p.34). In the case of Spain during the Catalan separatist movement, both the patriotic response 
by much of the Spanish state that emerged in response to Catalonia’s threats of separation as 
well as the separatist movement itself, if under the assumption that regional pride is its own form 
of nationalism, constitute nationalist movements. Immigrants − who often serve as reflections or 
representatives, however unintentionally, of their home country − would fall into this “external 
Other” category (Kleiner-Liebau, 2009). In a qualitative study on discrimination towards 
immigrants in Spain, many of the participants mentioned the role one’s home country plays in 
finding acceptance in Spain, claiming that “stereotypes created around certain cultures or 
nationalities, for example, the characteristics of Muslim religion, the political and social problems 
of Colombia, the education level and the language of the Africans, or previous experiences in 
the Spanish-born population with Romanian or other groups that they associate with criminal or 
terrorist groups” affect the way they are treated in Spanish society and affect their access to 
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institutional services that would ultimately help them integrate more easily (Agudelo-Suarez, 
2009).  
On the other hand, Spain is considered to be, overall, one of the most accepting 
countries to immigrants in the European Union, with 83% of Spanish respondents to the 2017 
Eurobarometer assessment on immigration claiming they would be comfortable having social 
relations of any type with immigrants (Figure 5, Eurobarometer, 2018). However, this number is 
somewhat misleading since in the majority of subdivisions of this category (friend, neighbor, 
work colleague, doctor, family member, manager), Spain ranks lower among other European 
nations and averages closer to 60% of respondents feeling “totally comfortable” with immigrants 
in these categories (Figures 6,7,8). 
 
 
Figure 5: Eurobarometer Report: Integration of Immigrants in the European Union  
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Figure 6: Eurobarometer Report: Integration of Immigrants in the European Union 
 
Figure 7: Eurobarometer Report: Integration of Immigrants in the European Union 
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Figure 8: Eurobarometer Report: Integration of Immigrants in the European Union  
 
Additionally, this study tracks European perceptions of immigration to each individual 
country. It specifically notes what Spanish respondents believe is the proportion of illegal to 
legal migration taking place in their country as well as the level to which respondents under or 
over estimate immigration levels. Spain (38%), along with multiple other Mediterranean and EU 
border nations, tends to have a high level of respondents who believe that there is a greater 
number of immigrants staying illegally than legally, despite the fact that according to Eurostat 
data, “during 2016, 984,000 third-country nationals were found to be illegally present in the EU, 
while 21.6 million third-country nationals were legally residing in the EU on 1 January 2017” 
(Eurobarometer, 2018). The fact that border nations hold a high percentage of citizens who 
overestimate the amount of illegal migration is most interesting when we note that “those 
[nations] with more positive perceptions of the impact of immigrants on society tend to 
overestimate less the percentage of immigrants in their countries,” and vice versa 
(Eurobarometer, 2018). Although Spanish citizens might claim to be “comfortable” with 
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immigrants, it does not necessarily mean they are accepting or that they believe they will have a 
positive impact on Spanish society.  
Today, attitudes towards immigrants in Spain remain divided. The 2017 Eurobarometer 
assessment discovered that equal numbers of Spanish citizens (26% of the overall population) 
view immigration as either a problem or an opportunity, while 33% of the population sees 
immigration as both (Eurobarometer, 2018). When compared with the earlier discussion of 
comfortability with immigrants in Spain, those who believe immigration to be more of an 
opportunity than a problem are more likely to be comfortable having social relations with 
immigrants (Figure 9). In this regard, Spain falls below other European nations that hold a high 
level of comfortability with migrants in its categorization of immigration as either a problem or an 
opportunity (Figure 9). 
 
 
Figure 9: Eurobarometer Report: Integration of Immigrants in the European Union 
 
As a possible counterargument, the Eurobarometer study claims that “there is a 
consistent tendency for respondents who have personal ties with immigrants to feel comfortable 
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having social relations with immigrants compared to respondents who do not have personal 
ties” (Eurobarometer, 2018). As such, it would make sense to claim that if the number of 
immigrants in Spain has risen, then it is more likely Spanish citizens have developed more 
personal ties with immigrants and will therefore feel more comfortable and accepting. However, 
only around 50% of Spanish citizens claim to have daily interactions with immigrants in one or 
more contexts, according to the Eurobarometer, and therefore it is difficult to determine how a 
rise in the number of migrants in Spain throughout the 21st century has affected the number of 
personal relationships between immigrants and Spanish nationals and their subsequent ability 
to feel comfortable with one another.  
 Ultimately, it is clear that attitudes towards immigrants in Spain have changed over time 
and yet there is a consistent belief that the integration of immigrants is essential to the 
betterment of the host country in the long run (Eurobarometer, 2018). There are different views 
of what it means to be well-integrated, but the most relevant to this study is the “immigrant’s 
commit[ment] to the [host] country’s way of life by accepting the values and norms of the host 
society” (Eurobarometer, 2018, p.89). In other words, the immigrant’s willingness to subscribe to 
the socio-cultural norms of a nation − the underlying definition of national identity in this study − 
is a determining factor of their ability to integrate into a host society. Sixty percent of 
respondents believe this to be “very important” and 36% believe it to be “somewhat important” 
to integration into Spanish society (Eurobarometer, 2018). Additionally, 87% of Spanish citizens 
claim sharing cultural traditions to be important to full integration (Eurobarometer, 2018). This 
analysis of attitudes regarding integration make sense in the context of Alkopher’s model of 
securitization of identity. A society which places emphasis on the subscription to cultural and 
social norms as a method of societal integration is one that views social cohesion as central to 
national identity. However, if social cohesion, or a general agreement upon social and cultural 
norms, does not exist then there is bound to be uncertainty, or even crisis, when it comes to 
national identity.  
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F. Who is Excluded? 
As has been discussed previously, the degree to which a migrant in Spain is able to 
integrate is largely dependent on their ability to adapt to the dominant socio-cultural climate of a 
nation. Spain is no exception to this rule as certain immigrants are treated more favorably and 
with more leniency than others, including those who are most easily able to integrate into 
Spanish society and those who boost Spain’s national reputation as a migrant friendly nation. 
As Spain has become the main entry point of migrants to Europe within the last year, it has 
publically made the world aware that, unlike its neighboring Meditteranean nations, Spain 
prioritizes the humanitarian nature of this struggle (Benavides, 2018). Spain, therefore, has 
becoming far more accepting of migrants arriving by sea than other European nations. 
However, at the same time Spain continues to strengthen its ties with Moroccan migration 
services in order to slow down migration from sub-Saharan Africa and keep these migrants out 
off the cities of Ceuta and Melilla, thus outside of Spain (Hedgecoe, 2018). Though Spain is far 
more tolerant than many other European nations and generally a progressive nation by 
European standards, their ability and willingness to be accepting to all should not be overstated. 
A poller from from firm Metroscopia claims Spain has a “fragile tolerance” of others, one that is 
often contingent on the others’ needs being met by society, indicating their tolerance is more or 
less dependent on integration and immersion into society.  
 
G. Drawing Connections: When “Internal Other” and “External Other” Meet 
The next step of this research involves understanding the intersections of internal 
otherization and external otherization to understand how otherization, in general, impacts 
national identity. An analysis of immigrant experiences in Catalonia reveals that otherization has 
the power to be a unifying force, yet it also expresses itself differently among various groups of 
people. Particularly, these differences in types of otherization are augmented in times of conflict, 
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like during the Catalonia Independence Movement. Immigrants to Spain tend to migrate and 
settle towards the metropoles, most notably Madrid and Barcelona. In fact, just under 14 
percent of Catalonia’s residents are foreign-born, one of the highest concentrations in all of 
Spain (Dowsett, 2017). Therefore, immigrant voices hold a powerful weight in Catalonian 
political happenings. In particular, throughout the independence movement, the voices of 
immigrant activists and supporters were largely propped up by pro-independence advocates in 
order to display Catalonia’s desire to create “a very open and integrated society” (Dowsett, 
2017).  
However, many of these migrants still face many struggles finding home and/or citizenship 
(and subsequently the right to vote) in their new home (Dewan, n.d.). Migrants face challenges 
integrating into Catalonia because being in this region means adapting to two different, often 
contrasting cultures. For example, migrants living in Catalonia must learn the Catalan language 
often along with Spanish in order to truly integrate into the national Spanish society, but also 
into their local Catalan society. In this sense, immigrants are welcomed into Catalan society as 
they recognize their similarities in their challenging relationship with the Spanish state, but at the 
same time immigrants face similar challenges of assimilating into a new society. In fact, 
immigrants claim that they did not truly feel settled into their new home and “truly Catalan” until 
they were able to speak the regional language (Dewan, n.d.). However, to a degree this 
continued importance placed on integration is unique in the case of Catalonia versus in the rest 
of Spain since the Catalan identity has also been traditionally repressed. This desire for 
migrants to assimilate to Catalan culture, adopting their language and traditions, is seen by 
many Catalans as a sign of respect for their historically undervalued culture (Dewan, n.d.). 
Catalans desire to be welcoming to migrants and to be respectful of other cultures, however, 
years of repression have resulted in a culture proud and defensive of their own traditions. 
Therefore, it becomes challenging to come to clear conclusions on the intersectional power of 
otherization. Though Catalonia might be more welcoming to migrants than the rest of Spain, 
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there still exists many of the same challenges of prioritizing assimilation to the dominant identity 
to embracing the cultural diversity of outsiders. Otherization can be a unifying force among 
those who do not feel welcome in a powerful, dominant society but there also exists various 
levels of privilege within otherization as welcoming societies continue to hold power over 
outsiders. The balance between inclusion and exclusion is tenuous and becomes all the more 
ambiguous among different groups of “others”.  
 
IV. Research Implications & Recommendations 
 
The implications of this study are very real in the current context as Spain continues to 
feel the impacts of the Catalonia Independence Movement and as it continues to receive more 
migrants of increasingly diverse backgrounds. The most clear implication of this research has 
been the seen in Spain’s most recent elections in April of 2019. This election was approached 
with much apprehension throughout the state because it had significant implications for the 
future of the nation considering its recent tumultuous political past. Overwhelmingly, the nation 
turned out to declare their support for the new left-wing government and for continued regional 
autonomy (Minder, 2019). On the surface, it would seem this election has proven Spain’s 
support for diversity, multiculturalism, and liberal politics. In reality, however, the road to this 
election was littered with a variety of ultraconservative voices normalizing a type of nationalism 
that has historically been taboo in Spain since the end of Francoism (Minder, 2019). Most 
distinctly, the populist far-right, anti-immigrant party Vox gained seats in the Spanish Parliament 
for the first time in history. While many scholars have viewed the slow emersion of more 
nationalist parties as a latent threat to Spain, this initial nationally scaled victory for the Vox 
party signals that this threat is becoming more of a reputable concern. Additionally, this rise in 
Vox’s influence in government is reflective of a further splintering of Spain’s political parties that 
has been occurring for the past four years. While Vox’s influence also merited a strong and 
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ultimately victorious response from socialist and leftist parties, it also represents a newly 
prominent and institutionalized voice of exclusionary politics in Spain. As politics in Spain 
splinters and moves rapidly toward the extremes and as identity politics become more 
prominent around the world, the goal of creating a unifying national identity grows even more 
elusive.    
This research also revealed the fact that attempts to create unification and inclusion can 
actually be an exclusionary force. In the case of Spain, there is a reciprocal cycle of exclusion 
and inclusion of “others”, both internal and external. On the one hand, “otherness” threatens the 
centralization of a uniform, socio-culturally cohesive national identity. However, on the other 
hand, the attempts to centralize and unify an identity leads to even greater exclusion of those 
who do not want, or who are unable to fit into the status quo of a nation. In terms of 
recommendations, this cycle of exclusion and inclusion can ideally be broken by shifting the 
conversation from prioritizing assimilation as the root of societal cohesion to embracing 
multiculturalism as the solution for seemingly conflicutal identities. Since it is clear that 
immigration will continue to bring people of diverse identities to Spain and that its history of 
regionalism is historically entrenched and unavoidable, the only way for Spain to form and 
stabilize its identity is if it embraces the “others” that inhabit it and create a state that embraces 




When a society is “confronted with or challenged by immigration, nations tend to 
redefine or reinforce what they believe to be the basic characteristics binding together the 
members of their particular “in group”’ (Kleiner-Liebau, 2009, p.34). However, if a nation is 
unable to find these basic characteristics that would theoretically define and unite its people, 
how can it address the challenge of immigration and come to a collective approach to 
integration or multiculturalism? Such is the case of contemporary Spain, as its contentious 
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history with multiculturalism and regional diversity has created a people divided by their own 
particular groups’ unique characteristics and unable to unite under a single national identity. 
Kleiner-Liebau’s reference to “Others,” both internal and external, is particularly relevant to 
Spain’s situation as diverse cultural groups and regional identities pose a challenge to the 
consolidation of a national identity that could bring its people together and develop national 
cohesion.  
Given the unique nature of the Spanish state itself in terms of regional history and 
immigration, perhaps the solution to Spain’s challenges in national identity formation is to 
address the need for multiculturalism and plurality. Many studies have assessed Spanish 
perspectives on the integration of immigrants into society, but if Alkopher’s different models of  
integrationist and multiculturalist approaches to immigration are be applied, there seems to be 
lacking research in regards to the potential for and opinions towards multiculturalism specifically 
in the case of the Spanish state. Such a perspective would be particularly interesting in the 
Spanish case study given the inherent multicultural nature of the Spanish society. Spain’s 
multifaceted identity proves challenging to those who wish to create a central national identity. 
Moreover, if the majority of Spanish citizens stick to the belief that migrants should be integrated 
into the national framework, but simultaneously cannot seem to develop consensus on what this 
identity actually is, then addressing the “immigration issue” will become all the more challenging 
as globalization continues to grow stronger and become more powerful a force.  
Ultimately, this research has shown that the existence of “otherness” is a powerful factor 
in determining a nation’s ability to form and maintain its national identity. Given Spain’s already 
rocky relationship with national identity, the strengthening division among regional identities and 
increased presence of diverse immigrants in recent decades pose a challenge to the formation 
of a centralized Spanish identity. Ultimately, “nations derive their cohesion and their strength 
from a sense of shared identity − from the story they tell themselves about who they are as a 
collective. When that sense of a shared story is eroded, the nation frays” (Abend, 2017, n.p.). 
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Spain’s long history of exclusion and repression makes finding a shared story among its 
uniquely diverse population a great challenge. Therefore, the question arises of whether or not 
the nation is sustainable if it cannot integrate these various histories into a shared identity. 
Furthermore, as these internal divisions continue in Spain, so do various forms of backlash, 
including, most notably, far right nationalism. This phenomenon has been investigated in the 
case of other European nations that have undergone national identity conflicts, but more 
research needs to be done on this trend in the case of Spain. Additionally, Spain’s specific 
responses to recent immigration surges should be investigated in greater depth and links need 
to be drawn between these crises and changing trends in perceptions of immigrants among 
Spanish nationals. Ultimately, in order to address the further splintering of Spanish society, it will 
be important to further investigate the power of otherization on a society and to determine how a 
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